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# RE-EXAMINING THE ROLES OF LANDPOWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

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William T. Johnsen

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE



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**William T. Johnsen**

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## PREFACE

Much has happened in the 16 years since this author penned a monograph entitled *Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century*. The United States suffered the tragedies of September 11, 2001, the first attack of a wave of large-scale extremist terrorist activities that have scourged the globe from London to Bali to Madrid to Mumbai to Nairobi and beyond. The invasion and subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and the ebbing war in Afghanistan have significantly engaged U.S. military power, especially Landpower, for over a decade. The ongoing volatility of the international security environment continues to generate crises that may embroil U.S. national interests: an increasingly erratic North Korea that may be on the verge of implosion, confrontation with Iran over its nuclear policies, the turbulence of the Arab Spring and its consequences, growing unrest in broad swaths of Africa, and multiple crises in the Middle East, to name but a few. Moreover, the dramatic rise of China as a global economic and regional military power and a resurgent and revanchist Russia could lead to renewed great power competition.

The character of warfare has undergone significant change, as well. Accelerating technological innovation, whether in new weapons or dramatically increased precision of older weapons, continues to revolutionize warfare. At the same time, the return of older forms of warfare, such as guerilla warfare and insurgencies, further complicate the conduct of modern war. The rise of nonstate actors with weapons that can exceed the capabilities of many states has emerged as a new factor. All of this in combination has led, supposedly, to new forms of warfare, such as hybrid warfare or 4th



Generation Warfare, that have increased the complexity of modern warfare. Lastly, the rise of cyber-based capabilities has yet to reveal the full extent of what may be an entirely new battlefield. All told, the character of warfare has changed remarkably, and will undoubtedly continue to do so.

Yet, numerous continuities remain. By the late-1990s, the American public already had grown tired of prolonged peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Africa and the Balkans.<sup>1</sup> Trying to bring democracy to the Middle East and Southwest Asia over the course of the last decade-plus has proven too expensive in terms of lives and treasure lost relative to perceived gains. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011 and the denouement of the war in Afghanistan have left a war weary U.S. public. Moreover, just as after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, prolonged counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq—with a heavy commitment of ground forces—has dulled any American appetite for further participation in counterinsurgency operations.<sup>2</sup>

Like the 1990s, rising fiscal pressures have accompanied this general disillusionment with U.S. global engagement. Political and military leaders have expressed concern that the number one priority for the United States is getting its fiscal house in order.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the United States is in the midst of executing a geo-strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region, an expensive undertaking. Budget constraints, particularly the rise of mandatory spending cuts, place increasing pressure on the Department of Defense budget.

These combined disenchantments have translated into a public leery of further interventions. While analysts and policymakers cannot know with certainty

whether the U.S. public and political leadership will countenance any more “long wars,” recent experience in Libya, strong opposition to U.S. involvement in the civil war in Syria, public apathy over the Russian seizure of parts of Ukraine, and indifference to renewed fighting in Iraq offer hints that future intervention may be difficult to undertake.

Because of the confluence of all of these issues, some national leaders, defense intellectuals, and analysts have questioned once more the continuing relevance of land forces and Landpower. Thus, in an incredibly ironic paradox, after 13 years of wars fought largely within the human dimension predominantly by ground forces that have borne the brunt of combat and casualties, proponents of Landpower feel compelled to explain Landpower and justify the retention of Landpower capabilities in the face of significant budget (and, therefore force structure and personnel) cuts.

The combination of these circumstances call for a new examination of the roles of Landpower in the 21st century.

## ENDNOTES - PREFACE

1. For examples of public opinion following Somalia, see Carolyn J. Logan, “U.S. Public Opinion and the Intervention in Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Interventions,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1996, available from [dl.tufts.edu/file\\_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00040.00013](http://dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00040.00013), accessed June 16, 2014. For public views on the Balkans, see, for instance, Lydia Saad, “Americans Hesitant, as Usual, About U.S. Military Action in Balkans,” Gallup News Service, March 24, 1999, available from [www.gallup.com/poll/3994/americans-hesitant-usual-about-us-military-action-balkans.aspx](http://www.gallup.com/poll/3994/americans-hesitant-usual-about-us-military-action-balkans.aspx), accessed June 16, 2014.

2. See, e.g., Nathan Freier, "How the Iraq War Crippled U.S. Military Power," *Defense One*, May 1, 2014, available from [www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/05/how-iraq-war-crippled-us-military-power/83566/?oref=d-skybox](http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/05/how-iraq-war-crippled-us-military-power/83566/?oref=d-skybox), accessed May 6, 2014. According to a NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll, 47 percent of Americans believe the United States should reduce its role in world affairs. Carrie Dann, "47% Say U.S. Should Reduce Role in World Affairs," available from [www.nbcnews.com/#/politics/first-read/47-say-u-s-should-reduce-role-world-affairs-n92871](http://www.nbcnews.com/#/politics/first-read/47-say-u-s-should-reduce-role-world-affairs-n92871), accessed May 12, 2014. As Nathan Freier *et al.*, point out, war costs, national debt, and a belief that large-scale wars are no longer likely exacerbates this war weariness. See Nathan Freier *et al.*, *U.S. Ground Capabilities through 2020*, A Report of the CSIS New Defenses Project, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2011, p. vi. For a realist perspective on recent events, see Steven M. Walt, "No Hawks Here," *Foreign Policy*, April 17, 2014, available from [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/17/no\\_hawks\\_here\\_realists\\_international\\_relations\\_war\\_peace](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/17/no_hawks_here_realists_international_relations_war_peace), accessed April 17, 2014. It is important to note, that even in the wake of Vietnam, the United States helped engage in counterinsurgency operations in Latin America.

3. See, as examples, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, p. 2; Tyrone C. Marshall, "Debt is Biggest Threat to Security, Chairman Says," American Forces Press Service, September 22, 2011, available from [www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65432](http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65432), accessed June 16, 2104; and *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN currently serves as Professor of Military History and Strategy in the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. From 1991-99, he served in the Strategic Studies Institute, ultimately as Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College from 1994-97. In 1999, he became the inaugural Associate Dean for Academic Policy, while also serving as the Director, Department of Academic Affairs. In December 2002, he assumed the duties of Acting Dean of Academics. In June 2003, Dr. Johnsen became the Dean of Academics, serving in that position until June 2012. After a 1-year sabbatical leave, he assumed his current duties. In addition to his academic career, Professor Johnsen served as an Infantry officer for 20 years before retiring from the U.S. Army. In addition to a variety of troop leading, command, and staff assignments, he also served as an Assistant Professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an arms control analyst at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Dr. Johnsen has authored over 30 monographs, articles, or book chapters on U.S. and European security issues. His book, *Forging the Foundations of the Grand Alliance: U.S.-British Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor, 1937-1941*, is forthcoming. Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University. He also is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.



## SUMMARY

After 13 years of prolonged ground combat, a weary American public is leery of further interventions requiring land forces. Shifting geo-strategic conditions, such as a revanchist Russia and a rising China, reinforce this reluctance. At the same time, technological innovation once more offers the chimera of war from a distance that does not endanger land forces.

Nonetheless, at some point, a highly volatile international security environment will place U.S. national interests at risk, requiring the use of military power. Given the increasing rise of interdependence among all components of military power (air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space), a better understanding of Landpower is essential if national leaders are to have a full range of policy options for protecting and promoting those interests.

Landpower, “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, exploit control over land, resources, and people,” stems from a country’s geo-strategic conditions, economic power, population, form of government, and national will. The military elements of Landpower include a country’s ground forces, the institutions that generate and sustain those forces, and the human dimension—intelligent, highly adaptable, and innovative individuals—so vital to the successful employment of Landpower.

Landpower offers policymakers tremendous utility in peace, crisis, or war, as it can defeat, deter, compel, reassure, engage, and support the nation. Within each of these roles, as well as across them, Landpower can carry out the broadest range of military operations. This versatility across the spectrum of conflict offers national leaders the greatest number of effective policy options.



# RE-EXAMINING THE ROLES OF LANDPOWER IN THE 21st CENTURY AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

... every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held its own theory of war...

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*<sup>1</sup>

Landpower is the ability – by threat, force, or occupation – to gain, sustain, exploit control over land, resources, and people.

*Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army*<sup>2</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

While some readers may be surprised to learn that an official definition of the term Landpower is a recent phenomenon, this circumstance may not be as odd as outside observers might think.<sup>3</sup> For many military practitioners, especially Soldiers and Marines, the concept of Landpower is so deeply ingrained that it is largely self-evident. It has existed since our first ancestors used their fists, rocks, and sticks to defend themselves from attacks by predatory neighbors. As a result, a several millennial-long understanding of land warfare exists. Indeed, key strategists and theorists, such as Sun Tzu, Niccolò Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Antoine-Henri Jomini, would not have thought of war as anything other than the application of Landpower.

At the same time, a less than clear understanding of the elements of military power reinforces this tacit understanding of Landpower.<sup>4</sup> For example, while fleets



and navies occasionally played vital roles throughout history, even major naval victories such as the Battle of the Virginia Capes in the American War of Independence, Trafalgar in the Napoleonic Wars, or Jutland in World War I, were adjuncts to the main events on land.<sup>5</sup> Even after American Alfred Thayer Mahan and Briton Sir Julian Corbett distilled the essence of a theory of sea or maritime power at the turn of the 20th century, command of the sea concerned (and still does) only a few nations and powers.<sup>6</sup>

There is even less historical experience with and, therefore, understanding of, the remaining elements of military power. Air power is a 20th century phenomenon. Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, William Mitchell, and other key contributors to the embryonic theory of air power could emerge only after the invention of the airplane.<sup>7</sup> Space is a late 20th century phenomenon, and cyberspace, while originating in the 20th century, is emerging in its own right only in the first decades of the 21st century. Neither of these last two elements of military power has yet found a consensus prophet.<sup>8</sup>

All of these conditions have reinforced the historical precedent of Landpower as the dominant element of military power. Since the latter half of the 20th century, however, new technologies and ways of employing those technologies have chipped away at that traditional understanding. While terms such as Military-Technical Revolution (MTR) or Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) may now be passé, no one disputes the accelerating changes in military technology that have occurred during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor does the pace of change appear to be slowing. These changes simultaneously and paradoxically blur the dividing lines between where,

when, and how the elements of military power might be employed. As a result, the historical dominance of Landpower may no longer translate into a self-evident understanding of Landpower.

Oftentimes, loose terminology further compounds misunderstanding. For instance, while professional military and civilians tend to use the terms Landpower, armies, land forces, and land warfare interchangeably, these terms are not synonymous. Moreover, interpretation of these words, like beauty, often lies in the eye of the beholder, and Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines frequently have different perceptions. Even within large segments of land forces, interpretations will vary considerably depending upon whether one is a Soldier or a Marine; has a strategic, operational, or tactical bias; is from a maneuver, operational support, or force sustainment branch; or serves in a particular unit or theater. These differing perspectives bleed over into official doctrine. While the Army has defined Landpower, an official Joint definition of Landpower still does not exist.<sup>9</sup> Thus, while the Army may have a particular view of Landpower, those outside the Army may not widely share that perspective.

The culmination of these factors too frequently results in divisive debates that reinforce convictions rather than clarify matters that help make U.S. military power and its land component more effective. If senior military and defense advisors are to help national leaders understand how best to orchestrate the growing interdependence of air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space power to promote and protect national interests, they must understand both the capabilities and limitations each power offers in conjunction with the other components of military power. The recent initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commander,


Special Operations Command to create the Strategic Landpower Task Force “. . . to study the application of landpower to achieve national objectives in the future,” underscores this imperative.<sup>10</sup>

To that end, this monograph first places Landpower in an appropriate context. It then elaborates on the concept of Landpower. Third, the monograph identifies the national and military elements of Landpower. Next, it examines the potential roles and missions of Landpower in the 21st century, to include an assessment of the strategic and operational versatility of Landpower. To assist policymakers in making future decisions, this assessment includes the strengths and weaknesses of Landpower. Finally, the monograph offers conclusions to spark a more informed debate on the roles Landpower in the 21st century.

## CONTEXT

Just as military power is but one instrument of national power, Landpower is but one element of military power. Military power combines with diplomatic, economic and informational power to form a whole, while Landpower works with air, cyberspace, sea and space power.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, at the strategic level, decisive results generally require orchestrating more than one element of military power, oftentimes in concert with other instruments of national power. Thus, despite the claims of their more extreme advocates, rarely will air, cyberspace, land, sea, or space power, alone, be sufficient to promote, let alone protect national interests. Granted, cases may arise where one form of military power may play a dominant role. However, for reasons explained more fully later, those occasions will be rare.

The term “conflict,” as opposed to warfare, generally will appear in this monograph. Conflict is a broader term that better describes anticipated conditions that range from peacetime competition (e.g., economic rivalries, diplomatic friction, and ideological antagonisms) through general war (to include the use of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]). Conflict also encompasses a wide range of military operations indicated in Figure 1 that support U.S. national interests.



**Figure 1. Range of Military Operations.<sup>12</sup>**

### **The Future Security Environment.**

A detailed and predictive examination of the future security environment is unlikely to yield much gain. While leaders someday may be able to divine the distant future with precision, today is not likely to be that day. Nor is tomorrow. Despite spending billions of dollars, our foresight is constrained. As one senior leader recently observed, even “the foreseeable future isn’t really foreseeable.”<sup>13</sup> Similarly, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has often remarked that when it comes to predicting the future with precision,

we have 100 percent accuracy—we have gotten zero right.<sup>14</sup> Worse, such a lack of clarity about the distant future security environment all too frequently leads to arguments over assumptions at the expense of the primary focus on the issue at hand. This is particularly true when engaging in debates over when and how to employ military power. For example, specific scenarios oftentimes quickly come under fire from those who do not agree on the need for X or Y conditions. Alternatively, critics may ridicule scenarios as fantasies or “laundry lists” used as a way to avoid a substantive discussion of the merits of a particular issue.

The foregoing is not an argument for not looking ahead. Forecasting is necessary, but one must avoid predictions that take focus away from the primary task. In this vein, the author offers a few general observations to establish a broad context of the future security environment that can facilitate an analysis of Landpower. First, despite our ardent desires, conflict is not going away. Long historical experience reinforces this fact, and current trends of the last 20-25 years indicate more of the same for the next 20-25 years. We also know from experience that unexpected security challenges are likely to erupt on little or no notice. The only forecast that has any degree of certainty is that somewhere, sometime in the coming years (undoubtedly not at the time of our choosing) some country, organization, nonstate actor, or combination thereof will place U.S. national security interests at sufficient risk to require a military response. When, where, and how that might occur is an open question, which means the United States is unlikely to have the luxury of planning against discrete security challenges. These uncertainties will require the United States to anticipate and prepare for a broad range of possible challenges.

In planning for such a range of outcomes, U.S. leaders would be wise to heed the sage advice of historian Sir Michael Howard, who years ago noted that getting things exactly right was less important (as well as less likely) than not getting things too wrong.<sup>15</sup> Regardless, U.S. political and military leaders also will have to hedge against unanticipated outcomes, the so-called “black swans” (such as using commercial airliners to attack buildings) that all too frequently arise.<sup>16</sup> Lastly, one should never forget that adversaries and competitors get a vote.

### **Military Elements of Power.**

As indicated earlier, the accepted elements or components of military power include air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space power. All five elements will remain relevant to future conflicts. The question is what might be the appropriate blend of the five. There is no current argument, compelling or otherwise, that the traditional dominant elements of land, sea, and air will fade from prominence any time soon. Nonetheless, space and cyberspace may take on larger roles than heretofore.

For example, while this author agreed 16 years ago that space overarched all physical domains, he argued that space had not yet achieved status as a full-fledged element of military power in its own right. The increasing dependence of modern military forces upon capabilities based in space have called that conclusion into question as the operations in the physical domain of space have assumed greater importance in peace, crisis, and war.<sup>17</sup> Thus, while space presently continues to serve predominantly as an enabler of the other elements of military power, it clearly has secured its

place as a key element of military power. As space capabilities continue to evolve, air, cyberspace, land, and sea power may exploit the possibilities inherent in space, and use of space assets and capabilities undoubtedly will increase.

Similarly, the 1998 monograph argued that it was too soon to conclude definitively that cyberspace would soon become a discrete element of military power.<sup>18</sup> The time has come to reconsider that conclusion. On the one hand, cyberspace and the information that flows through it, like space, is a tool that supplements, complements, and, indeed, permeates all of the existing elements of national and military power. While cyberspace has its limits, costs, and potential consequences, it might soon become an element of military power in its own right if the virtual world and artificial intelligence continue along their current trajectories. Until such a time, national and military leaders will have to obtain as complete an understanding of cyberspace power and its strengths and weaknesses as possible to ensure cyberspace power continues to augment and enable the remaining elements of military power. Just like all elements of military power, cyberspace power cannot be an end unto itself.

## INTERDEPENDENCE

The 1998 monograph posited that interdependence—then defined as “orchestrating the appropriate components of military power in ways that achieve desired results”—would increasingly become the norm for the U.S. military.<sup>19</sup> The original monograph argued that interdependence, as a concept, went beyond the then current scope of joint operations, which essentially sought close cooperation among the Ser-

vices to achieve military and national objectives.<sup>20</sup> At the time, this author argued that interdependence would go beyond integration of Service capabilities to the point where Services would depend upon each other for the performance of the majority of the roles, missions, and tasks that national leaders call upon the Armed Forces of the United States to perform. That idea has been borne out by historical experience over the last 16 years. Indeed, military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised interdependence from a hypothetical concept to a fact of modern U.S. warfare, as *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces*, now defines joint interdependence as “. . . the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both (i.e., synergy), the degree of interdependence varying with specific circumstances.”<sup>21</sup>

While this definition is a good first step, a better understanding of how interdependence has and will continue to evolve will be imperative for effective U.S. responses to the future demands of the 21st century security environment.<sup>22</sup> Only by thoroughly understanding of how Services and Special Operations Forces can contribute to air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space power will the U.S. military be able to maximize the effectiveness of interdependent operations. As importantly, anticipated budget constraints and demands of the international security environment will make interdependence a necessity.

One of the key tenets of interdependent operations is that no one element of military power (or its contributing Services) exists in isolation. Under this author’s conception of interdependent operations, every element operates in multiple domains and supports the other elements. In interdependent opera-



tions, therefore, the question is not which element of military power to apply. Rather, the key question is, what is the most appropriate mix of elements given the circumstances, missions, and capabilities required? In other words, interdependence results from the synergy gained by appropriately orchestrating the elements of U.S. military (and national) power to influence an opponent at least cost. The metaphor of a tapestry best illustrates, perhaps, this concept. The respective elements of military power (and their contributing Services) represent the threads that make up the tapestry. Individual threads, while essential for creating the tapestry, cannot create a picture. Even collectively, a picture emerges only when the weaver works the threads in a carefully planned and executed pattern. Extending the metaphor to demonstrate the extensive capabilities inherent in interdependent operations of the Services, a weaver can weave any number of threads and patterns to create endless varieties of pictures.

Paradoxically, the future orchestration of these multiple capabilities will be both easier and harder as the clear distinctions between the elements of military power continue to blur. For example, from ancient times through the mid-20th century, states exercised sea power primarily against other ships. Granted, limited operations against coastal fortifications and ports, and amphibious operations occasionally occurred. However, the application of sea power on land was limited to a narrow coastal strip. Today, carrier based aviation and cruise missiles extend the reach of sea power asymmetrically deep into the hinterland and airspace of most states. Amphibious operations can reach well beyond shorelines to strike deep into littoral areas, as well. Thus, sea power extends into the air and land elements of military power.

Similarly, in its infancy, air power initially reconnoitered ground forces. Quickly, however, the ability to attack ground targets from the air opened up the possibility of influencing land combat.<sup>23</sup> Eventually, the range of aircraft permitted air forces to strike deep into an opponent's territory directly to attack its war making potential. These capabilities also allowed similar missions far out to sea. The advent of intercontinental bombers, atomic weapons, and missiles provided air power global reach—in the air, on land, and at sea.


In the last half century, Landpower also has moved well beyond the confines of ground operations. Today's armies possess missiles that range the upper reaches of the atmosphere to counter opposing aircraft and to provide ballistic missile defense. Many armies hold significant air power in the form of transport and attack helicopters. The dividing line between close air support of ground operations provided by fixed-wing combat aircraft and helicopters continues to thin. The addition of ground-to-ground missiles of increasing range, precision, and lethality may further reduce air power's role in supporting land warfare.<sup>24</sup> The likelihood of helicopter to helicopter or helicopter to fixed-wing combat aircraft engagement further smudges the dividing line between air and Landpower. Landpower also provides security for air bases, and, historically, Landpower asymmetrically has denied enemy air forces operating bases.<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, land and sea power are interlinked. As the noted British naval theorist, Sir Julian Corbett, stated over 100 years ago, sea power exists predominantly to transport land forces and support land operations.<sup>26</sup> Landpower historically has defeated sea power by seizing enemy harbors and seaports from

the land.<sup>27</sup> Conversely, as China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) concept portends, ground-based anti-ship missiles have considerable potential to influence operations far out at sea, especially in the littoral regions. Such influence undoubtedly will increase as technology improves.<sup>28</sup>

The critical issue facing future national leaders and military planners, therefore, is not identifying which element of military power – air, cyberspace, land, sea, or space – will dominate the future security environment. Indeed, such arguments and discussions – usually conducted with intense passion – generate much counterproductive ill will. Rather, in most cases along the conflict spectrum, success will require the application of more than one type of force and power.<sup>29</sup> The key question will be how best to blend the components of military (and usually national) power to provide the desired result.

Figure 2 reflects this broader view of military power and the relationships among air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space power. This notional diagram conveys a number of key concepts. First, as indicated earlier, military power is composed of multiple, subordinate components: air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space. Second, specific force types provide the basis for component power, but they do not automatically equate to power (i.e., land forces are subsumed within but do not equate to Landpower). Third, the intersection of a force type with another component indicates that forces can contribute to other components of military power, as well (e.g., air forces with land or sea power). Cyberspace and space envelop the remaining three inextricably intertwined elements; thus, military power stems from the synergistic and mutually supporting interaction of all five components.



**Figure 2. Interdependence.**

Although not portrayed in the pictograph (for reasons of clarity), the interaction of the other instruments of national power (political, economic, and diplomatic) with the military instrument is equally important for understanding how nations generate and apply power. These instruments could intersect the outer circle of military power, or one or more of the components, depending upon the particular conditions. Nevertheless, the message should be clear: the blending of suitable tools, not an individual instrument, usually leads to success.

In such a notional chart, air or sea power easily could have served as the central point. Moreover, the actual distribution of responsibilities among the forces and components would vary according to the missions, tasks, and desired outcomes. Specific condi-

tions, such as potential opponent, terrain or environment, forces at hand, time available, and the desired national policy objective, also would influence the selection and application of components. In certain cases, one type of force or element of military power might predominate in a particular mission. For example, in conducting Operation FREEDOM FALCON (Libya, 2011), air power — whether land- or sea-based — played the predominant role. Initial operations in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, on the other hand, highlighted the close cooperation between air power and Special Operations Forces. Similarly, U.S. Marines launched from air- and sea-based platforms into land-locked Kandahar Province.

Initial operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, on the other hand, underscored how the simultaneous integration and synchronization of all elements of military power can generate overwhelming combat power. Once the insurgency broke out after U.S. military toppled Saddam's regime, however, Landpower (to include Special Operations Forces) once again became the primary tool of the U.S. military effort. To be sure, air, cyberspace, sea, and space forces contributed to the fight, but ground forces provided the overwhelming proportion of military power employed.

Despite the interdependence that will characterize most modern military operations, planners must keep in mind that the rising occurrence and significance of interdependent operations does not diminish the importance of any one element of military power. Interdependence will not mean the complete merging of Services or the disappearance of unique forces. There will continue to be missions or tasks that only Soldiers, Marines, airplanes, ships, electrons, or

satellites can accomplish. Thus, the drive to interdependence must ensure that the U.S. military retains the requisite unique Service capabilities within the physical domains.

Interdependence also will require national and military leaders to capitalize on the strengths and minimize weaknesses of the individual components. To do so, leaders must first understand the capabilities of each type of military power. They can then determine how best to orchestrate these capabilities to produce desired outcomes, while preventing an adversary from exploiting potential vulnerabilities. In some cases, this may mean that a single component of military power will dominate. In others, it will require the careful orchestration of two or more components to achieve decisive results. In a metaphorical sense, this means having the suitable tools in the toolkit for the problems of the 21st century security environment. For example, when needing pliers, one hopes to find more than screwdrivers and Allen wrenches. Alternatively, one could use a flat tip screwdriver in lieu of a wood chisel, but the results may be much less efficient and effective. At the same time, such use may damage the screwdriver. One could easily extend the metaphor to the idea of having multiple toolkits (components of military power) and being able to draw the most suitable tools from one or more toolkits to address a particular tactical, operational, or strategic level issue.

Specific conditions also will influence force composition. For example, conflict in restricted terrain such as mountains and cities, especially where “collateral damage” is a concern, may limit most activity to land forces. Similarly, within certain smaller-scale contingencies, such as humanitarian assistance, peace

support, peace enforcement, or counterinsurgency operations, land forces may have much more utility than air- or sea-based forces, which may be better suited to punish or compel. Equally, air and sea power have areas that will remain their preserve. Control of the air and sea largely (but not solely) will remain the functions of forces that contribute to air and sea power.<sup>30</sup> Unless circumstances or technological developments change dramatically, sea power will continue to provide the means to carry out amphibious operations. Large-scale air transportation will be an air power capability, just as sea transportation undergirds sea power. Cyberspace and space power will undoubtedly contribute. Rarely, however, will either be the primary driver of success.

Notwithstanding the increased interdependence of the elements of military power, policymakers and military practitioners must ensure that they do not take the principle to unnecessary extremes. Once more resorting to an analogy, consider the Leatherman tool. Regardless of size, a Leatherman tool has wonderful utility; however, it also has limitations. It has pliers, but not the best. It has two screwdrivers, but only one size of each type. It has a saw, but no one will cut many two by fours with it.<sup>31</sup>

Nor should leaders pursue interdependent operations simply to ensure that Services get their “piece of the action.” As Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed mission to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran in 1980, reminds, such provisions can be not simply counterproductive, but catastrophic.<sup>32</sup> Instead, leaders and planners need to implement interdependence carefully to achieve national policy objectives with appropriate efficiency and, more importantly, greatest effectiveness. This will not be easy.

## LAND POWER IN THE 21st CENTURY

### Landpower Defined.

In 2005, *Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army*, promulgated the Army's first official definition of Landpower: "Landpower is the ability – by threat, force, or occupation – to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people."<sup>33</sup> Seven years later, *Army Doctrinal Publication 1, The Army*, retained the original definition from FM-1, but slightly expanded the explanation of Landpower to include:

- Impose the nation's will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
- Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in any operational environment.
- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development.
- Address the consequences of catastrophic events – both natural and man-made – to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.
- Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.<sup>34</sup>



## ELEMENTS OF LANDPOWER

Landpower stems from a wide variety of factors. For convenience, these determinants fall into national and military elements that, in aggregate, contribute to Landpower.

### **National Elements.**

At the national level, a broad range of factors contributes to Landpower. Historically, for instance, **geo-strategic conditions** have exerted considerable influence over which component would be the most dominant form of military power. Continental powers, such as Russia, Germany, China, India, and France, historically have relied primarily on Landpower.<sup>35</sup> Granted, states or empires with extensive access to the seas (for example, Spain, the Netherlands, and France) sometimes maintained a considerable sea-based force and sought to establish themselves as sea powers, but concern for land warfare and Landpower prevailed overwhelmingly over time.<sup>36</sup> Still, today, most nations rely primarily on ground forces to fulfill their security needs.

Even for the United States, the world's foremost naval power, distinctions over whether the United States is a continental or a maritime power are increasingly irrelevant. The United States has global interests. Because of the diverse geography and geo-strategic conditions of where U.S. national interests lie, the United States will have to possess all components of national military power, to include Landpower. The more pertinent question, therefore, is not which form of military power should predominate, but what proportion of forces and power will most effectively meet the specific conditions of a particular event or crisis.

**Economic power** obviously has a defining influence on the ability to build and sustain Landpower. This stems not only from the general state of the economy, but extends into how much of that economy is devoted to military power, in general, and Landpower, in particular. The extent of the military and civil industrial base (especially the degree to which the civilian base can easily convert to military use) also will contribute to or detract from Landpower. So too will the ability to generate and sustain technological innovation over time. A country's economic infrastructure, particularly communications, information, transportation, and financial networks, will influence the ability to project Landpower. Finally, as the rise and fall of empires, such as Spain, Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United States, amply demonstrates, states must match their economic capacity to meet their security interests or suffer what historian Paul Kennedy termed as "overstretch."<sup>37</sup>

**Population** and the ability to mobilize that population for economic and military ends also affect Landpower. Obviously, the traditional markers of size, distribution, demographics, class structure, and education will influence the degree of economic power and personnel available for military use. Of increasing importance will be the subset of populace mentally and physically qualified to serve, as well as their propensity to join the Armed Forces.<sup>38</sup>

Lastly, the strategic culture of populations will shape the employment of Landpower. For example, Britain's long seafaring tradition and distrust of standing armies led to a strong navy and small army that relied on allies to assume the major burden of land warfare. Conversely, primarily continental powers, such as France, Germany, and Russia relied heavily

on land forces and largely failed as sea powers. Since World War II, the United States has been globally engaged. Whether the United States will sustain that commitment or return to more traditional policies of avoiding foreign entanglements and fielding a small standing army remains to be seen.

The **form of government** affects the nature of Landpower and its employment. Authoritarian political systems, for example, may depend heavily upon Landpower to maintain their regimes. Thus, they pose a threat to their populations as well as to their neighbors. This may result in bifurcated force structures capable of offensive operations against neighbors, as well as gendarmerie or heavily armed security forces for internal control. Conversely, democratic governments may have little or no call to use their military domestically other than for disaster relief or rare and targeted support of civil authorities. Externally, despite the notion that democratic nations have fewer propensities to use military power, democracies will resort to force when their national interests are at stake. In addition, they will structure their forces for offensive and defensive purposes.

The **national will** to use Landpower, particularly in the modern age, has a significant influence on its eventual employment. In sum, the best-manned, equipped, and trained force in the world can be largely irrelevant without the national will to wield that potential; or, at the least, not to oppose its use. The national will to employ Landpower may vary considerably depending upon several factors. First, the nature of national interests involved and the degree of risk to those interests will influence national will. A vital national interest at high risk may make generating national will easier. However, one needs look no

further than Britain and France in the Inter-War Era to see that such may not always be the case. Similarly, the current U.S. reluctance post-Iraq and Afghanistan to employ Landpower for less than perceived vital national interests offers another viewpoint. Despite this reluctance, however, many nations, including the United States, appear willing to allow land power to participate in military engagement activities, peace-keeping operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions even when vital or important national interests are not at stake.

### **Military Elements.**

The core of Landpower obviously stems from the **ground forces** (Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces; active and reserve components) that are available. Nevertheless, ground forces alone do not represent the full extent of a nation's Landpower. Instead, national and military leaders should think of Landpower in terms of ground forces operating interdependently with the other elements of the U.S. Armed Forces, in coalition with allies and partners, in conjunction with government agencies, and in collaboration with international organizations to promote and protect national interests.

The **institutions** that generate and sustain those forces are equally important to Landpower. In short, the recruiting, training, equipping, maintaining, and sustaining functions that generate and undergird the capabilities of the fighting force are equally essential for creating and sustaining land power. Also important are the doctrinal procedures and systems that create and sustain the common operating culture that allow forces to operate most effectively. Equally critical

to an effectively functioning force are the leadership, discipline, and morale that bind the force together. In addition, for a nation with global interests, the ability to project forces to the point of crisis in sufficient time to act effectively and to sustain those forces constitutes a key element of Landpower.

The **human dimension** of military power is nothing new. Indeed, the importance of the human dimension has been well documented since Thucydides wrote his history, *The Peloponnesian War*, nearly 2,400 years ago.<sup>39</sup> Machiavelli and Clausewitz likewise saw the centrality of the human dimension. More modern strategists or historians, such as Colin Gray, Michael Howard, John Keegan, Williamson Murray, and Hew Strachan, have continued to stress the vital importance of the human dimension for understanding war and warfare.<sup>40</sup>

Modern militaries, especially their Landpower components, depend heavily on the ability of innovative, adaptive individuals who can react quickly to rapidly changing conditions. To be successful, land forces must recruit and retain high quality personnel, and train and mold them into cohesive teams. This cohesion stems from individual and collective morale and *esprit de corps* that creates a synergistic whole far greater than the aggregate of individual talents. Without this reservoir of talent, Landpower cannot hope to prevail. Indeed, Landpower, more than the other components of military power, depends upon human interaction and innovation for success.<sup>41</sup> Assuredly, all components of military power rely upon high quality personnel; but there is one key difference. Air and sea forces essentially employ weapons systems or support platforms that require people to operate them. Land forces, conversely, tend to recruit people and then equip them.

One should not confuse the concept of the human dimension with the recently proposed concept of a human domain comparable to air, cyberspace, land, maritime, and space domains.<sup>42</sup> Proponents of establishing a separate and distinct human domain may be unnecessarily muddying the issue. Wars quintessentially are fought between and among humans for control of, or at least influence on, human will. Such control usually (but not always) requires defeat of an opponent's armed forces or control of an adversary's land or population. While air and sea power (and increasingly cyberspace and space power) can temporarily deny control of a particular space or may assist in taking control, they cannot sustain that control on their own.<sup>43</sup> Only Landpower can seize and, importantly, sustain control for a prolonged period. Finally, although some humans live on the sea, some fly in the air, and an increasing number may utilize cyberspace, the fact remains that the overwhelming bulk of humanity occupies the land. Proponents of a separate human domain, therefore, may be making a distinction without a difference that will not withstand scrutiny.

## **STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL VERSATILITY: ROLES AND MISSIONS OF LANDPOWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY<sup>44</sup>**

Landpower will continue to have tremendous utility in peace, crisis, and war, and across the conflict spectrum from peaceful competition to general war. Within war, Landpower will continue to apply across all levels of warfare—tactical, operational, and strategic.<sup>45</sup> For these reasons and more (as will become apparent), Landpower will continue to play a critical role in the fundamental purposes of military power:

defeat, deter, compel, reassure, shape, and support to the nation.<sup>46</sup>

### **Defeat.**

Defeat of an opponent's forces seems a relatively straightforward proposition. As previously indicated, however, defeating an enemy's military is a necessary, but insufficient first step. In some cases, defeat of a country's military forces may be sufficient to control the will of an opponent's leadership. In other cases, defeating an adversary's military forces may not translate into political victory. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce, victory may require bending the will of an adversary's populace, which normally requires prolonged control of those people. While air, cyberspace, sea, and space power can deny control for discrete periods, they cannot sustain long-term physical or psychological control, and in many cases, cyber and space power may be largely irrelevant. Such a level of control usually requires Landpower.<sup>47</sup>

### **Deter.**

Deterrence, according to Stanford University professors Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, occurs when a potential adversary concludes that the cost of an action is not worth the potential outcome.<sup>48</sup> For most of history, Landpower provided the overwhelming bulk of deterrent capability. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, air and sea power, especially when augmented with nuclear weapons, added significantly to the calculus of deterrence.

Deterrence in the future, however, may take on a different form than in the recent past and require some changes in the military contribution to that role. The emergence of rogue states, or nonstate actors, with access to nuclear devices or material, but who do not share the long-standing and highly developed culture of deterrence that emerged during the Cold War, may further complicate deterrence. Equally disturbing is the rise of states, transnational organizations, criminal groups, and terrorists that may come into the possession of chemical or biological agents. Because such groups might harbor the perception that there is little likelihood of facing effective retribution, or might be indifferent to such punishment, a threat of nuclear retaliation may not suffice.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, as many states and actors do not possess nuclear weapons, nuclear retaliation would likely appear disproportionate to the world community and, therefore, is unlikely to be credible. Finally, the absence of superpower competition may diminish the heretofore-dominant role of nuclear weapons within deterrence policy.<sup>50</sup>

Conventional forces, therefore, are likely to play a larger deterrent role than in the recent past and the nature of that role may expand. If, for example, a country retains an activist policy of intervening in areas to ensure stability, then the number of potential actors to be deterred may be substantial. Second, the risks posed by potential adversaries will fall across a broader range of the conflict spectrum than was the case with the relatively limited requirements of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Third, deterrence depends on communication—messages clearly sent and understood. However, cross-cultural communications, which undoubtedly will increase, can be exceptionally difficult.<sup>51</sup> Because of this rising impor-



tance of conventional deterrence, policymakers will have to devote increased attention to designing credible deterrent mechanisms, such as coalitions and alliances, force presence and deployments, and enforced sanctions and embargoes.<sup>52</sup>

Under these cumulative circumstances, Landpower likely will expand its long-standing contribution to deterrence.<sup>53</sup> The fact that many regional powers remain predominantly land powers reinforces this likelihood.<sup>54</sup> This is not to argue for Landpower's dominance in deterrence. Certainly, air and sea power will remain significant contributors to deterrence; however, Landpower has more ability to deter across a wider portion of the conflict spectrum than may be the case with the other components of military power.<sup>55</sup>

## **Compel.**

As political scientist and policy practitioner Thomas Schelling noted in 1966, compellence involves the use or threat of force to get an adversary to do what you want.<sup>56</sup> Compellence can range from defeat of an opponent's military forces to punishment to the limited use of force to achieve goals to the threat of force to obtain desired objectives. These latter nuances fall under what Craig and George term coercive diplomacy, where policymakers apply, individually or in concert, the military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of national power to "persuade" another actor to adopt a particular course of action.<sup>57</sup>

Coercive diplomacy is not new; indeed, recorded history offers countless examples. Even in the Cold War, when the risks of escalation to superpower nuclear confrontation tended to circumscribe coercive diplomacy, policymakers had to make difficult

choices against the backdrop of the communist threat and the possibility of escalation. The decreased potential for nuclear confrontation, however, may reduce the encumbrances on the use of military power and could lead to coercive diplomacy assuming a larger role in future U.S. policy.<sup>58</sup>

Coercive diplomacy usually demands a blend of the instruments of national power that are context sensitive, are appropriate to achieve the national objectives involved at the lowest possible cost, and are within an acceptable level of risk. Military power, when used as an effectual tool of diplomacy, offers national leaders a broad range of policy options. Landpower, in particular, can respond to low-level conflict, conduct all missions associated with peace operations, participate in smaller-scale contingencies (such as raids, strikes, or limited campaigns), or help prosecute a major theater war. Naturally, the effectiveness of Landpower's contribution will vary with the conditions, as will those of air, cyberspace, sea, and space power. Because Landpower is the principal source of military power for many states and actors, Landpower represents the ultimate form of compellence. The emphasis here is that Landpower uniquely can place an opponent's sovereignty at risk.<sup>59</sup> This combination offers national leaders an extensive set of options for responding to a particular event or crisis.

### **(Re)Assure.**<sup>60</sup>

Reassurance, according to historian and strategist Sir Michael Howard, who coined the term, ". . . provides a general sense of security that is not specific to any threat or scenario."<sup>61</sup> The purpose of assurance, however, is not simply to keep allies and friends

contented. Assurance serves a country's interests by advancing national values and beliefs; promoting regional stability; improving cooperation among allies, partners, friends, and, occasionally, adversaries; reducing the perceived need for military competition; and cultivating good will. All of these elements (and more) contribute to an improved international security environment that ultimately benefits not only individual nations, but also the global community.

While the presence of air and sea power can assure friends and allies, these partners sometimes may perceive these elements of military power as transient demonstrations of U.S. resolve. In addition, continental nations or regional powers who do not have a long tradition of relying on air or sea power do not necessarily see these elements as an ultimate guarantor.<sup>62</sup> While the importance of the assurance role may have diminished somewhat in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, recent aggressive Russian actions in the Caucasus and, especially, Crimea and Ukraine once more have brought assurance of regional actors and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the fore. The dispatch of U.S. land forces to Poland and the Baltic States in response to ongoing Russian aggression once more reinforces that Landpower offers the highest level of national commitment to a partner's sovereignty, offering considerable assurance.

Similarly, recent Chinese activities in East Asia have renewed the importance of assuring U.S. partners and allies in the region. As envisaged in AirSea Battle, air and sea power are likely to play major parts in assurance, but there is a growing recognition that Landpower still has a vital role to play under that concept. Nor have key allies forgotten about U.S. Land-

power presence on the Korean Peninsula, or the role of ground forces in the Philippines.<sup>63</sup>

### **Engagement.**

The U.S. military also has a significant stake in the peacetime promotion and protection of U.S. national interests and objectives. Over the last 2 decades, the use of the military instrument of power to help shape the international security environment has grown in importance. Generally, shaping activities may include:

- Rotational deployments for exercises and training.
- Foreign attendance in U.S. professional military education activities.
- Building partner capacity.
- Security force assistance.
- Civil affairs support for stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts.
- Foreign internal defense.
- Counterterrorism and support to counterterrorism.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.<sup>64</sup>

Additionally, the U.S. Armed Forces can expect increased contributions to the already significant levels of peacetime engagement missions: peacekeeping or other peace operations (e.g., support to diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), nation assistance, military-to-military contacts, and security assistance.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, recent history has demonstrated the nature and scope of such support. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief will no doubt remain critical engagement activities.<sup>66</sup>

While all elements of national military power support engagement activities, Landpower is the most significant contributor. This is not to argue that air and sea power do not participate in engagement activities. U.S. air and sea forces, for example, are key contributors to humanitarian assistance operations. Few civilian organizations in the world or even most militaries have the capability to move massive amounts of supplies as quickly and as effectively to the point of natural or man-made crisis. Equally, air and sea power, individually or in combination with the other components of national military power, help promote stability in key regions of the world through exercises, information sharing, and military-to-military contacts. Air and sea power also provide capabilities needed to prevent or reduce conflicts and threats.

Landpower, nonetheless, still offers the greatest number of options and operational flexibility. Moreover, most current and anticipated partners rely predominantly on land forces for their security. Much of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, have predominantly land-oriented forces and land security issues. In Europe, air, cyberspace, sea, and space power clearly have roles to play, but again, Landpower predominates. Even in parts of Asia, where sea and air forces logically may have a larger role, land forces will still play a considerable part. Thus, Landpower frequently offers policymakers the most suitable instrument of military power.

### **Support to the Nation.**

The importance of the critical roles outlined above oftentimes overshadow another vital military role: support to the nation. The U.S. military and, espe-

cially the Army, historically have provided considerable domestic support.<sup>67</sup> While the next decades will pose challenges different from the 19th and early 20th centuries, the U.S. military will remain engaged in domestic support operations. Missions could vary from traditional disaster relief and support of civil authorities to combating international crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism; to contributing to border and refugee control; to assisting in the rebuilding of national infrastructure; to responding to ecological disasters; even to supporting the delivery of health care to underserved segments of U.S. society.

Once again, most of these tasks fall to the forces that comprise the basis for Landpower. Other components of military power contribute, but the reality is that the capabilities inherent in air and sea power and the environments in which they operate limit their ability to perform most support roles. Thus, the greatest portion of these missions and tasks fall to land forces, specifically the Army.

### **Specific Roles and Missions.**

While a useful starting point, the conceptual underpinnings outlined earlier are only a first step. A necessary second step is to identify more specific roles and missions that U.S. military power, generally, and Landpower, specifically, can expect to perform. Fortunately, a number of key legal, policy, and doctrinal publications establish the most important roles and missions of Landpower. While not exhaustive, the outline that follows offers sufficient extracts from a few key documents that underscore the number, breadth, and scope of missions that U.S. military power, and specifically Landpower, can expect to carry out on behalf of the nation.

At the level of the Department of Defense (DoD), the *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* established three pillars of U.S. Defense Strategy that influence the roles and missions of Landpower: protect the homeland, build global security, project power and win decisively.<sup>68</sup> In a similar vein, *The National Military Strategy, 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership* stipulated that the U.S. military and, hence, Landpower, must be able to counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, and shape the future force.<sup>69</sup>

Key Joint and Service leaders have expanded these general requirements to include more specific missions for the U.S. Armed Forces. For example, in *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*, General Raymond T. Odierno (Chief of Staff, Army), General James F. Amos (Commandant, USMC), and Admiral William H. McRaven (Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command) have identified the following primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces:

- Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare;
- Deter and Defeat Aggression;
- Project Power Despite Anti-Access Area Denial Challenges;
- Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction;
- Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space;
- Maintain a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent;
- Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities;
- Provide a Stabilizing Presence;
- Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations; and,
- Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations.<sup>70</sup>

For the Army, specifically, 10 U.S. Code 3062 clearly establishes that:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of:

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and,
- (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.<sup>71</sup>

The law further details that the Army “. . . shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for *prompt and sustained combat* [emphasis added] incident to operations on land.”<sup>72</sup>

Taking into account all of this guidance (and more), *Army Doctrinal Publication* (ADP)-1, *The Army*, identifies the current core and enabling competencies for the Army, which also apply more generally to Landpower:


- Core Competencies
  - Combined arms maneuver
  - Wide area security
  - Special operations
- Enabling Competencies
  - Support security cooperation
  - Tailor forces for the combatant commander
  - Conduct entry operations
  - Provide flexible mission command
  - Support domestic civil authorities



- Mobilize and integrate the Reserve Components.<sup>73</sup>

The limited guidance outlined here underscores the number and scope of the roles and mission that Landpower (as part of interdependent operations) can expect to perform. Moreover, the events of the last 2 decades have amply demonstrated that these roles and missions are not merely hypothetical. Nor are they likely to be hypothetical in the near term. Granted, some may argue that the future can be different from the past—and perhaps it can be. Recent trends and enduring U.S. national interests argue, however, that Landpower can expect more of the same for the near future.

A key reason behind the reasonable expectation that national leaders will continue to call frequently upon Landpower capabilities is that Landpower offers tremendous utility across almost the entire spectrum of military conflict. (See Figure 3.) As the last 2 decades amply illustrate, Landpower offers significant versatility across the entire spectrum of conflict and throughout the range of military operations. In the last decade, alone, this performance has extended from support to domestic authorities to peacetime engagement activities to shaping the international security environment, to responding to smaller-scale contingencies to joint and combined operations in a two theaters of war.



**Figure 3. Utility Along the Spectrum of Military Conflict.**

Highlighting the versatility of Landpower in no way diminishes the utility of the other elements of military power. Cyberspace and space power, however, tend to play complementary rather than individually decisive roles. Air and sea power will remain critical elements for most scenarios and under the right conditions can play decisive individual roles. Indeed, the further to the right on the conflict spectrum, the more

effective air and sea power become. However, the further left on the conflict spectrum the generally less effective and, therefore, less appropriate they may be.

Of course, Landpower is not without its limitations. When projected beyond home shores or overseas bases, Landpower depends upon air and sea power for deployment, as well as long-term sustainment and support. Without friendly control of the air and seas, land operations are difficult, if not impossible, to carry out and sustain.<sup>74</sup> When engaged in most smaller-scale contingencies and, certainly, major theater war, Landpower depends heavily upon the capabilities that air and sea power bring to the conflict. Certainly, cyberspace and space power provide critical enabling capabilities.

Employing ground forces also can present a number of obstacles. First, Landpower may be slower to deploy and may lack the relative ability to strike deep quickly or in as great strength as air and sea power. Second, Landpower also is more prone to friction than the other elements of military power. As analyst Lukas Milevski points out, "Landpower, of all forms of power, has perhaps the greatest density of moving parts; particularly so if one considers all the support it requires to operate effectively."<sup>75</sup> The greater the number of units usually involved in ground operations only compounds these frictions. Weather and terrain also exacerbate these conditions. Additionally, for the near future, opposing land forces have a greater opportunity to disrupt land operations than an adversary's air or sea forces may have to disrupt operations in those domains.<sup>76</sup>

Third, because land forces represent the highest perceived level of U.S. commitment—domestically, as well, as externally—conditions may have to reach

crisis proportions before decisionmakers commit Landpower. Such delays may inhibit earlier employment that might have eased circumstances before they erupted in full-blown crisis. Alternatively, deployment of insufficient land forces may encourage an aggressor to act before forces are fully capable of responding. Lastly, if deployed, land forces may be difficult to disengage from active conflicts.<sup>77</sup>

Fourth, an aversion to danger and casualties may inhibit the use of Landpower. Land forces can be the most susceptible to casualties, and the numbers of land forces and their proximity to danger, especially armed opponents, raises the likelihood of casualties.<sup>78</sup> Policymakers, therefore, may view employing Landpower with apprehension. Certainly, since the end of the Cold War, particularly when U.S. ground forces were committed with less than vital national interests at stake, public and political anxiety over U.S. casualties reached significant levels. Whether this trend will continue in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is an open question, but it is possible that such concerns could spill over into crises where important or vital U.S. interests are involved.<sup>79</sup>

In this regard, a perception exists that air and sea power offer a more bloodless—friendly, enemy, or civilian—form of warfare. Part of this perception stems from an American infatuation with technology. Air and sea forces tend to use technologically sophisticated platforms that simultaneously make land forces seem archaic while offering the tempting chimera of weapons that can strike with precision from afar without drawing friendly or too much enemy blood. Compounding the fascination with technology is the manpower intensive nature of Landpower operations that may expose more American sons and daughters

to injury and death. Nonetheless, as the supposedly inadvertent Iraqi attack on the USS *Stark* (1987), the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia (1996), and the attack on the USS *Cole* (2000) illustrate, sea and air forces also are vulnerable to such casualties.

Finally, land operations oftentimes have much greater media and public transparency than those on the sea and in the air where media reporters and cameras seldom go. Granted, an errant bomb can grab a headline, but most of what happens on the sea or in the air, space, and cyberspace lies beyond the normal reach of media attention. Land operations, however, can come under considerable scrutiny. As a result, if something goes wrong, it is more apparent, more prone to publicity, and more likely to affect U.S. reputation and interests than operations in the other domains.<sup>80</sup>

If recognized, however, these limitations can be offset or ameliorated. In some instances, the other elements of military power can take up the slack or fill in the gaps. Alternatively, leaders and planners may have to recognize the negative aspects and work within them. For example, Landpower holds the potential for higher levels of casualties. As a nation, we need to recognize now that national interests at some future point may cause casualties and build the necessary resilience into the national will. We should not accept the illusion that some other instrument of national military power offers a “clean,” casualty free (for the United States, at least) option.

## CONCLUSIONS: LANDPOWER – A MEANS TO AN END, NOT AN END

An increasingly uncertain and ambiguous international security environment, combined with the complexity of modern warfare, argues for greater clarification of what Landpower means in 21st century terms. These circumstances do not presuppose that the previous essence of Landpower, understood for ages, is no longer relevant. Nothing could be further from the truth, for as the analysis indicates, many of the enduring elements of Landpower remain relevant. Nonetheless, the evolution of Landpower and the growing volatility of the international security environment argue for a more comprehensive understanding of the future roles of Landpower. Equally important, such understanding will assist national leaders in more effectively orchestrating Landpower in concert with the air, cyberspace, sea, and space elements of military power to achieve greater interdependence.

Rarely will such orchestration be easy. Leaders will have to strip away the more extreme or aggressive claims of advocates of a particular component of military power, and identify which capabilities are best suited for a particular task. Because of the dynamic nature of conflict and conditions, such deliberations will be necessary for nearly every new mission. Undoubtedly, jurisdictional quarrels among elements of military power and Services will resurface. While these issues deserve debate, and competitive analysis oftentimes identifies opportunities, key leaders cannot allow such frictions to degenerate into “turf battles” so common over the last half-century.

As a first step in reducing the number, scope, and severity of such turf battles, leaders must not only

recognize, but act in accord with, the fact that no one element of military power can provide comprehensive capabilities for every contingency across the entire spectrum. No ground force commander, for example, wants to enter into battle without U.S. air superiority or control of the sea. At the same time, no advocate of Landpower would ever propose that land forces conduct naval operations or seize command of the sea. Yet, air and sea power advocates sometimes propose that they can unilaterally achieve land control.<sup>81</sup>

A better understanding of Landpower that includes strengths and limitations will help policymakers in making future decisions. Only with such a comprehensive understanding will leaders and planners be able to identify not only the capabilities required, but as importantly, from whence those capabilities should come. Absent such understanding, policy and the execution of strategy to implement that policy will suffer.

Landpower's greatest contribution to overall national military power is its inherent versatility. This versatility stems from the types and range of activities Landpower can undertake, and the ability of land forces quickly to adapt existing organizations to meet the demands of a particular mission profile or rapidly changing tactical, operational, or strategic conditions. Landpower capabilities offer national leaders the broadest range of options for handling opportunities or crises. These options cannot be matched by other elements of military power because they are limited by the domains in which they operate or by the nature of their equipment. Landpower's utility is particularly evident along the lower portions of the conflict spectrum. Here, operations rely less on a technological response from a "system of systems" to mass deadly

effects and more on human interaction, which Landpower is best suited to supply. This may be especially true for most peacetime engagement and shaping activities.

Not least, the human dimension will continue to dominate war and warfare. Indeed, successful military operations will still rely on the human capacity to react quickly to a highly fluid and nuanced environment to produce decisive results. In counterinsurgency or state-building activities, people usually will be more effective than platform-based solutions.<sup>82</sup> Immersed in the human dimension, Landpower is the most capable component of military power in this most critical of all realms.

A good understanding of Landpower is not an end unto itself. This analysis is only a first step in building an understanding of how to orchestrate land, air, cyberspace, sea, and space power to conduct interdependent operations, where the whole is greater than the sum of the aggregate capabilities of the five elements. In this light, this monograph, therefore, has sought not to exaggerate the capabilities inherent in Landpower or to divide the “military power pie” into better defined, but increasingly irrelevant pieces. Rather, the monograph provides a better understanding of Landpower that will help policymakers place Landpower in its appropriate context, recognize its strengths and acknowledge its weaknesses, while elaborating Landpower’s interdependence with the other elements of military power. In this manner, the analysis seeks to facilitate the development of effective policy options and contribute to better decisions, for when considering the employment of military power, such decisions never come easy.



## ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 593.

2. *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)-1, The Army*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2012, p. 1-4, available from [armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR\\_pubs/dr\\_a/pdf/adp1.pdf](http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf), accessed March 1, 2014.

3. The official term used by the U.S. Army War College is Landpower (initial capitalization, one word).

4. Just as national power consists of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements, each sub-component has constituent parts. For the purposes of this analysis, military power will consist of air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space power. In this monograph, an element of national (or military, etc.) power is something that contributes to aggregate national (or military, etc.) power. An instrument of national (or military, etc.) power is a mechanism through which national leaders wield some portion of that accumulated national (or military, etc.) power. The terms elements(s) and component(s) are synonyms.

5. That said, sea power played the dominant role in exploration and colonization over several centuries.

6. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*; and Sir Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, both contained in David Jablonsky, ed., *Roots of Strategy*, Book 4, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999. Internet accessible versions of Mahan and Corbett may be found at Project Gutenberg, [www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13529](http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13529) and [www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15076](http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15076), respectively, accessed June 7, 2014.

7. Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*; and William Mitchell, *Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power – Economic and Military*, are in Jablonsky, *Roots of Strategy*. For a concise overview of interwar air power theory, see David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: Theorists of Air Power," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to*

*the Nuclear Age*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 624-647.

8. Martin Libicki, a leading cyberspace expert, argues that the time may not yet be ripe for a cyberspace prophet. See Martin C. Libicki, "Why Cyber War Will Not and Should Not Have a Grand Strategist," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2014, pp. 23-39.

9. ADP 1, p. 1-4; *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (hereafter JP 1-02), available from [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf), accessed March 1, 2014, does not define Landpower. Nor does JP 1-02 define air power or sea power. JP 1-02 does define "land control operations: The employment of ground forces, supported by maritime and air forces (as appropriate) to control vital areas of the land domain. Such operations are conducted to establish local military superiority land operational areas." *Ibid.*, p. 159. Interestingly, JP 1-02 also defines sea control operations ("The employment of forces to destroy enemy naval forces, suppress enemy sea commerce, protect vital sea lanes, and establish local military superiority in vital sea areas." *Ibid.*, p. 240), but does not define air control operations.

10. General Raymond T. Odierno, General James F. Amos, and Admiral William H. McRaven, *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*, n.d., p. 1, available from [www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf](http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf), accessed March 1, 2014. The scope of the Strategic Landpower Task Force's charter reinforces this conclusion. The task force is to:

- address the role of forces "that operate on land," and how they can contribute to preventing and containing conflict;
- address why past tactical and operational successes have not always achieved strategic outcomes;
- reinforce the necessity of integrating our understanding of achieving physical objectives with a fuller understanding of, and consideration for identifying and achieving human objectives in the formulation and execution of strategy, operational plans, and tactical actions; and,
- expand the dialogue around the "social sciences" of warfare alongside the "physical sciences" of warfare.

11. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 25, 2013, p. I-1, available from [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf), accessed March 3, 2014. See John Spanier and Robert L. Wentzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th Ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1996, pp. 293-384, for a discussion of these instruments and their employment.

12. Figure taken from JP- 3.0, *Joint Operations*, August 11, 2011, p. V-1, available from [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf), accessed March 1, 2014.

13. In compliance with the U.S. Army War College policy of nonattribution, this speaker must remain anonymous. For a broader discussion of this issue, see Colin S. Gray, *Defense Planning for National Security: Navigation Aids for the Mystery Tour*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press, March 2014.

14. Micah Zenko, "100% Right 0% of the Time," *Foreign Policy*, October 16, 2012, available from [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/16/why\\_the\\_military\\_cant\\_predict\\_the\\_next\\_war](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/16/why_the_military_cant_predict_the_next_war), accessed February 24, 2014. Nor is Secretary Gates alone in this regard, as key military leaders such as former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral (Ret.) Mike Mullen, and former Central Command Commander General (Ret.) James Mattis have offered similar evaluations of our forecasting abilities. *Ibid.*

15. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, Vol. 119, No. 2, March 1974, p. 7.

16. Nassim Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, New York: Random House, 2007.

17. JP 1-02 defines the space environment as "The environment corresponding to the space domain, where electromagnetic radiation, charged particles, and electric and magnetic fields are the dominant physical influences, and that encompasses the earth's ionosphere and magnetosphere, interplanetary space, and the solar atmosphere," p. 251.

18. JP 1-02 defines cyberspace as “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers,” p. 67.

19. William T. Johnsen, *Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998, p. 16. For a slightly different view of the interaction among the Services, see Colonel John Bonin, “Mutually Supporting Relationships,” Exercise Joint Warrior, Discussion Issue 6, Interrelationships Land-Sea-Air Forces, April 1, 1998.

20. JP 1-02, “joint operations—a general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces,” p. 152.

21. JP 1, p. I-2.

22. The idea of Globally Integrated Operations contained in the *Capstone Concept of Joint Operations* (CCJO) addresses aspects of the concept, but not in sufficient detail. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, Washington, DC: Joint Staff, September 10, 2012, pp. 4-13, available from [capstone.dodlive.mil/files/2013/04/CCJO-Sep2012.pdf](http://capstone.dodlive.mil/files/2013/04/CCJO-Sep2012.pdf), accessed March 27, 2014.

23. Where general air parity existed, e.g., throughout World War I, the ability of aircraft to observe offensive preparations allowed opponents to mass defensive forces, thereby contributing to the stalemate that marked most of the Western Front.

24. For instance, the PAC-3 version of the Patriot Air Defense Missile System and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) equipped with Brilliant Antiarmor Submunitions (BAT) and Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) munitions.

25. The obvious examples are the Allied campaigns in North Africa, Italy, and Europe and the U.S. island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific during World War II. I am indebted to my colleagues, Professor John Bonin and Professor Leonard Fullenkamp, for this observation.

26. Sir Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, David Jablonsky, ed., *Roots of Strategy* Book 4, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999, pp. 170-171. Also see Sir Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Part I, Chap. 1, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911, p. 1, available from [www.gutenberg.org/files/15076-h/15076-j.htm](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076-h/15076-j.htm), accessed June 10, 2013.

27. See, e.g., J. Michael Robertson, "Sea Control Remains Critical," *Proceedings*, April 1997, p. 80. There is a long history of such operations: from the Peloponnesian Wars, to Alexander the Great versus the Persians, to Napoleon denying Britain bases in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, to Union forces capturing Confederate seaports in the U.S. Civil War, to the land capture of German submarine pens in World War II. Once again, I thank Professor John Bonin for bringing these citations to my attention.

28. These capabilities are not just quantitatively different from the past, where shore batteries could deny ships access to ports and a relatively narrow band of coastline. Today, land- or air-launched cruise missiles extend their reach hundreds (and soon, perhaps, thousands) of kilometers out to sea. This represents a significant qualitative change in the land-sea power equation.

29. As an example of an argument against the likelihood of success using a single defeat mechanism, see the critique of the Douhetian defeat mechanism in AirSea Battle, in Huba Wass de Czege, "Improving the Mental Maps that Inform Defense Policy," *Army*, February 2014, p. 20.

30. For example, Army air defense and missile defense systems will contribute to air power and land-based anti-missile systems will influence the employment of sea power.

31. I am grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Darry Grossnickle, USMC, for prompting this analogy.

32. For an account of the operation, see Admiral James Holloway *et al.*, *Rescue Mission Report*, August 1980, available from [www.history.navy.mil/library/online/hollowayrpt.htm](http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/hollowayrpt.htm), accessed April 26, 2014.

33. *Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army*, Washington, DC: June 2005, p. 1-1. For a discussion of various ways to define power prior to the Army's official efforts, see Johnsen, *Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century*; H. Richard Yarger, "Land Power: Looking Toward the Future through a Green Lens," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1999, pp. 22-30; and Michael Evans, *The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present, and Future of Landpower*, Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Center, 2004.

34. ADP 1, p. 1-4.

35. For an excellent exposition on the qualities of the "Continental School," see Evans, *The Continental School of Strategy*.

36. Interestingly, Spain, Japan, and the United States also have generated considerable Landpower. Britain and The Netherlands offer, perhaps, the best example of heavy reliance on sea power, followed by the United States in the late-19th and 20th centuries. For a critique of Britain's reliance on sea power at the expense of Landpower, see Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*, Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1991, pp. 88, 162-163, 321, 338-339, 449, 539-540. (I am indebted to Professor John Bonin for bringing this information to my attention.) Granted, continental powers occasionally struck out to sea (e.g., France in the 17th and 18th centuries, and Germany in the early-20th century), but their strategies and operations focused almost entirely on Landpower.

37. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York: Random House, 1987.

38. For examples of recruiting concerns, see Major General Allen W. Batschelet, Rick Ayer, and Colonel Mike Runey, "The Army We Need; the Army We Can Have," *Army*, February 2014, pp. 30-32, available from [www.ansa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2014/Documents/02February/Batschelet\\_February2014.pdf](http://www.ansa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2014/Documents/02February/Batschelet_February2014.pdf), accessed June 9, 2014.

39. Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, New York: Touchstone Books, 1996.

40. The human dimension so pervades the works of these scholars that specific citations are not useful.

41. The U.S. Army's Human Dimension Concept, for example:

. . . provides a framework for how the future Army must select, develop, sustain, and transition Soldiers and Army Civilians to prevent, shape, and win in the 21st century. This concept redefines the parameters of the human dimension as encompassing the cognitive, physical, and social components. It includes all aspects of Soldier, Civilian, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in unified land operations.

*U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-7, The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept*, May 21, 2014, p. 5, available from [www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/TP525-3-7.pdf](http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/TP525-3-7.pdf), accessed June 7, 2014.

42. For a brief overview of the concept of the human domain, see, for example, Claudette Roulo, Armed Forces Press Service, "McRaven: Success in Human Domain Fundamental to Special Ops," June 5, 2013, available from [www.defense.gov/news/news-article.aspx?id=120219](http://www.defense.gov/news/news-article.aspx?id=120219), accessed June 7, 2014; and Otto Kreisher, "Landpower Leaders Stress Need to Understand Human Domain in Warfare," Association of the United States Army, Annual Meeting 2013, available from [www.ausea.org/meetings/2013/Annual-Meeting/Pages/story42.aspx](http://www.ausea.org/meetings/2013/Annual-Meeting/Pages/story42.aspx), accessed June 7, 2014. For a broad discussion of the concept, see Frank Hoffman and Michael C. Davies, "Joint Force 2020 and the Human Domain: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?" *Small Wars Journal*, June 10, 2013, available from [smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-force-2020-and-the-human-domain-time-for-a-new-conceptual-framework](http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-force-2020-and-the-human-domain-time-for-a-new-conceptual-framework), accessed June 7, 2014.

43. Lukas Milevski, "Fortisissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy," *Parameters*, Summer 2012, pp. 7-8.

44. "Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and U. S. Special Operations Command were established by law." "Core Mission Areas are broad DoD military activities required to achieve strategic objectives of the *National Defense*



*Strategy and National Military Strategy*,” and “Functions are the appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, including responsibilities of the Armed Forces as amended.” The term “function” includes purpose, powers, and duties. Specific Functions of the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command are located in DoD Directives. Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*, January 2009, pp. 3-4, available from [www.defense.gov/news/jan2009/qrmfinal-report\\_v26jan.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2009/qrmfinal-report_v26jan.pdf), accessed April 26, 2014.

45. There may be little utility, therefore, in defining Landpower against a specific level of warfare. Thus, defining “strategic landpower” as does the Strategic Landpower Task Force (SLTF, *Clash of Wills*, p. 3) or describing strategic land power as an “operational concept” (Gary Sheftick, “Strategic Landpower Doctrine must be developed, involve new skills,” *AUSA News*, March 2014, p. 20) may be counterproductive. Such formulations could limit how national leaders perceive the utility of Landpower across the spectrum of conflict, artificially limiting the scope of its contribution to national objectives and interests.

46. See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 1-34; and John F. Troxell, “Military Power and the Use of Force,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Strategy*, 5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, pp. 224-225.

47. As Milevski has pointed out: “The potential to take and actually exercise control is the core difference between Landpower and all other tools, military and nonmilitary, of grand strategy.” Milevski extended his argument, noting that, “Landpower, because it alone has the capability to take and then exercise control on the decisive geography of war, is the unique tool capable of and necessary for imposing one’s will on the enemy directly and actively.” Milevski, “*Fortissimus Inter Pares*,” p. 14.

48. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 172. For an excellent discussion of this concept, see *ibid.*, pp. 172-188.



49. The difficulty of tracing exactly those responsible for an isolated or terrorist act is well known. Equally, zealots of ideological or religious ilk may be indifferent to any potential retribution.

50. The United States must retain a credible nuclear deterrent. Long-standing concepts will retain utility, albeit with greatly reduced numbers of warheads and delivery systems.

51. Steven Metz, "Deterring Conflict Short of War," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 44-51.

52. Deterrence theory existed long before the advent of nuclear weapons, but conventional deterrence theory has been overshadowed the last 60 years by nuclear weapons. John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, regenerated interest in the topic. For discussions of more recent renewed interest in conventional deterrence, see e.g., Michael S. Gerson, "Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age," *Parameters*, Vol. XXIX, Autumn 2009, pp. 32-48; and Tom Nichols, "The Case for Conventional Deterrence," *The National Interest*, November 12, 2013, available from [nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-conventional-deterrence-9381](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-conventional-deterrence-9381), accessed June 9, 2014.

53. For a discussion of the reasons behind this trend, see William T. Johnsen, *The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implications*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 18, 1997, pp. 7-8.

54. The origin of the Korean War offers a more modern example of the deterrent effect of Landpower from the perspective of an opponent. North Korean Dictator Kim Il Jung and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin were reluctant to take overt action against South Korea until U.S. ground troops withdrew. The withdrawal occurred in late-1949, and the invasion followed in June 1950. See William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 31.

55. For example, the Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy administrations discovery that "massive retaliation" using nuclear weapons delivered by air-and sea-based platforms was not

always a credible deterrent across the conflict spectrum led to the emergence of the doctrine of “flexible response” that offered national leaders more policy options.

56. See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 69-92. Deterrence and compellence differ in that deterrence seeks to dissuade an actor from undertaking a particular action, while compellence seeks to “persuade” an actor to do what you want.

57. For a discussion of coercive diplomacy, see Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 189-203. Examples might include economic sanctions or embargoes, demarches, military raids, or punitive campaigns.

58. Events of the post-Cold War Era lend credence to this conclusion. One could view the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as examples of where initial use of coercive diplomacy failed, thereby requiring campaigns to overthrow the governing regimes. Russian actions in the Caucasus and Ukraine also are pertinent examples. Demands for U.S. action in Syria and international efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions are also examples.

59. I am grateful to Colonel Tarn Warren for this insight.

60. “American English” tends to use the term “assure” versus “British English” that tends to use “reassure.” This is another example of two great peoples separated by a common language, but as Sir Michael Howard coined the original term, a tip of the hat in his direction.

61. Sir Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,” *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-1995, p. 165.

62. As my colleague, Professor Leonard J. Fullenkamp, aptly points out: “What made Pax Britannica credible was not just the great English Navy, although it was important. What made England great was the certainty that on the heels of crisis came the ‘thin red line’ of British troops that would make good on England’s promises.” See also Captain Paul Lushenko, “The Real Question Isn’t Naval Presence but How to Best Empower U.S. Partners in Asia,” *The Best Defense, Foreign Policy*, available from [ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/04/09/the\\_real\\_question\\_isnt\\_na](http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/04/09/the_real_question_isnt_na)

*val\_presence\_but\_how\_to\_best\_empower\_us\_partners\_in\_asia*, accessed April 9, 2014.

63. For a description of AirSea Battle, see DoD, *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges*, May 2013, available from [www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf), accessed June 9, 2014. For an example of reassurance to countries in the region, see, for example, President Barack Obama's trip to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines in April 2014 that culminated with the signing of a new U.S.-Philippines defense pact. Thomas Maresca, "Obama Visits Philippines; U.S. Announces Defense Pact," *USA Today*, April 27, 2014, available from [www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/04/27/us-philippines-defense-pact/8299491/](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/04/27/us-philippines-defense-pact/8299491/), accessed June 9, 2014.

64. Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh and General Raymond T. Odierno, *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, Washington, DC April 19, 2012, p. 5.

65. In this period of increasing turmoil and instability, conflicts such as Libya, Syria, Mali, Central African Republic, Nigeria, and many other possible candidates seem more likely to occur. While some might argue that the United States should avoid such operations, U.S. national interests or the interests of our close allies and partners may draw us into such conflicts.

66. Militaries generally possess the capabilities needed for rapid and effective response to natural or man-made disaster, or providing capabilities beyond those available to a host nation. This may take the form of humanitarian assistance (such as the response to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 or the tsunamis that struck Indonesia and Thailand in 2004 or Fukushima, Japan in 2011) or humanitarian intervention in the Balkans from 1991 to 1999.

67. For example, exploring the western frontier, serving as a constabulary force in newly settled regions, engineering railroads and inland waterways, constructing the Panama Canal, and conducting medical research.

68. Barak Obama, *National Security Strategy, 2010*, Washington, DC: The White House, available from [www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf), accessed April 26, 2014; Admiral M. G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011*, Washington, DC: DoD, available from [www.army.mil/info/references/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf](http://www.army.mil/info/references/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf), accessed April 26, 2014; Leon Panetta, *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, Washington, DC: DoD, January 2012, available from [www.defense.gov/news/Defense\\_Budget\\_Priorities.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf), accessed April 26, 2014; and Chuck Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, Washington, DC: DoD, pp. 13-22, available from [www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_Quadrennial\\_Defense\\_Review.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf), accessed April 26, 2014.

69. *The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America: Redefining America's Military Leadership* 2011, p. 4. The NMS further called for a Joint Force that is:

- Adaptable and capable of deterring aggression and providing a stabilizing presence, especially in the highest priority areas and missions in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe and other allies and partners.
- Ready, rapidly deployable, and expeditionary such that it can project power on arrival.
- Capable of defending the homeland and providing support to civil authorities.
- Possessing cutting-edge capabilities that exploit our technological, joint, and networked advantage.
- Able to reconstitute quickly or grow capabilities as needed.
- Above all, manned and led by the highest quality professionals.

See also *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, p. 1.

70. *Strategic Landpower*, p. 2. Also outlined in ADP-1, p. 3-1.

71. 10 USC 3062, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, available from [www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/html/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleB-part1-chap307-sec3062.htm](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/html/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleB-part1-chap307-sec3062.htm), accessed April 25, 2014.

72. *Ibid.*

73. ADP-1, p. 3-3-3-8. For some proposed changes to these core competencies, see Major Jeremy Sauer, Chris Stolz, and Captain Michael Kaiser, "Core Competencies for an Army of Preparation," *Army*, February 2014, pp. 40-45.

74. The obvious case is where an opponent possesses air power capabilities. Even when an adversary has little or no air forces or power, friendly air power routinely makes critical contributions to the land battle: close air support, interdictions, and strategic attack.

75. Milevski, "*Primus Inter Pares*," p. 13.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 12. For example, many countries possess little or no modern capability in sea or air forces and no capability in space forces.

77. On the inability to disengage, see Nathan Freier, "MIA in QDR: A Unifying Vision for Land Forces," *Small Wars Journal*, 2010, p. 3, available from [www.smallwarsjournal.com/](http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/), accessed on February 16, 2014.

78. Milevski, "*Primus Inter Pares*," pp. 12-13.

79. Political and public concerns over U.S. intervention in Libya and Syria are illustrative.

80. I am grateful to Dr. William Pierce of the U.S. Army War College for bringing this thought to my attention.

81. See, e.g., the more extreme claims of air power advocates in the wake of the bombing campaign in Kosovo, initial operations in Afghanistan, or the "shock and awe" air campaign early in the Iraq War.

82. For example, people are more effective than laser guided bombs at separating and then developing effective working relations between formerly warring parties.

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